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LEGISLATING A HOMESTEAD BILL:
THOMAS HART BENTON AND THE
SECOND SEMINOLE WAR
by M ICHAEL E. W ELSH *
Thomas Hart Benton espoused in his long
O Senate career,causes
few demonstrate more clearly his perseverance
F THE MANY

and determination than his support for Florida during the Second Seminole War (1835-1842), culminating in his Armed Occupation Act of 1842. The United States government and its
citizens, in pursuit of a policy of aggressive territorial growth,
met the stubborn resistance of an exotic blend of runaway slaves
and expatriate Indians in the swamps and marshes of the Florida peninsula. 1 Determined not to suffer a fate similar to other
southeastern tribes during the years of Indian removal, the Seminoles mounted a guerilla campaign which drained the United
States militarily, economically, and emotionally. 2
The length of the conflict led many observers to despair
of any solution short of complete withdrawal. For a people
enamored of their “Manifest Destiny,” submission to an “uncivilized” enemy bordered on the unthinkable. As chairman of
the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Benton watched with
increasing alarm the reversals suffered by the United States
forces in Florida. As a major spokesman for frontier expansion
and liberal land policies, he empathized strongly with the struggle
of Florida’s citizens to assume their rightful position in the
union of states. As a slaveholder he recognized the tensions between abolitionist and slaveowner recurring in the debates on
the prosecution of the Indian war. But above all Benton was a
*

Mr. Welsh is a doctoral candidate in United States history at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.

1.

John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (Gainesville, 1967), 2-21. The term “Seminole” is a Creek word meaning “runaway” or “wild one.” It applied in the nineteenth century to a variety
of Indian groups and their black allies and kin throughout the peninsula.
2. Ibid., 321-27. Congress dictated the transfer of the southeastern tribes
west of the Mississippi in 1830, in response to southern pressure for
fertile Indian lands for white settlement.
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nationalist and desired a moderate course to solve the maze of
problems attendant to the conflict. 3
By 1839 Benton had serious reservations about the efficiency
of conventional troops in the Florida campaign. Neither regular
army forces, amply supplied and equipped, nor militia units
could dislodge the Seminoles from their protection in the forests
and swamps. In 1837 Benton himself had thought that western
frontiersmen, familiar with travel through the wilderness, knowledgeable of Indian habits and warfare, and capable of living off
the land, would quickly conclude hostilities. 4 After several fruitless volunteer campaigns, including one from his home state of
Missouri, Benton revised his thinking on the strategy of the war.
Convinced of the futility of offensive warfare in Florida,
Benton seized upon a plan to populate the peninsula with hardy
yeoman farmers, willing to cultivate and defend the land. Such
an idea was not new either to the senator or the nation. Malcolm
J. Rohrbaugh has called America’s public domain, or unsettled
frontier, the “magnet” which attracted “one of the greatest mass
migrations in the history of the world.“ 5 The inexorable spread
of settlers reshaped the land, as they planted new crops and instituted new ideas about government and democracy. Benton
admired the virtues fostered by possession of private property,
at one point calling for “gratuitous grants” to all land seekers.
Their labor extracted wealth from the soil, he said, and formed
the backbone of the nation. 6
On January 3, 1839, Benton rose before the third session of
the Twenty-Fifth Congress to present both his interpretation of
the Seminole War and his solution, entitled, “A bill for the
armed occupation and settlement of that part of the Territory
of Florida overrun by hostile bands of marauding Indians.“ 7 The
war had revealed many divisions within the society at large, he
recalled, especially “party spirit,” which led various writers and
politicians not to condemn the Seminole resistance but to praise
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Elbert B. Smith, “Thomas Hart Benton: Southern Realist,” American
Historical Review, LVIII (July 1953), 795-807.
William Richard Gentry, Jr., “Full Justice”: The Story of Richard
Gentry and His Missouri Volunteers in the Second Semiole [sic] War
(St. Louis, 1937?), 4-5.
Malcolm J. Rohrbaugh, The Land Office Business (New York, 1968), 295.
William M. Meigs, The Life of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia,
1904), 164-76.
Congressional Globe, 25th Congress, 3rd sess., 95.
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the Indian action. Benton feared that the “future historian who
should take these speeches and publications for their guide (and
they are too numerous to be overlooked), would write a history
discreditable to our arms, and reproachful to our justice. It
would be a narrative of wickedness and imbecility on our partof patriotism and heroism on the part of the Indians.“ 8
To preclude “the danger of such a history,” Benton, both as a
member of the party in power (the Democrats) and a United
States citizen, felt moved by “an imperious sense of duty” to expose such errors. The major cause of the war, he felt, was not in
the illegality of the Treaty of Paynes’s Landing signed in 1832,
whereby seven Seminole chiefs allegedly agreed to removal to
lands west of the Mississippi and then later refused to comply.
Instead, Benton argued that the Indians pursued the war because
of their “thirst for blood and rapine,” coupled with their “confident belief” that the swamps would protect them from pursuit
by the whites. 9
Benton then presented his bill to enable white citizens to
populate the interior of Florida. It offered free land, weapons,
and rations for one year in return for permanent settlement in
the area. 10 The bill was read and ordered by the Senate to a
second reading. 11 On February 5, 1839, Arkansas Senator Ambrose
Hundley Sevier of the Committee on Military Affairs reported
out the newly-named Armed Occupation bill without amendment. Sevier recommended prompt passage of the bill, and it
was then ordered up for a third and final reading. 12
The following day the Senate resumed consideration of the
measure. After Benton suggested a few minor semantic changes,
Senator William Campbell Preston of South Carolina, an opponent of the legislation, moved that further action on it be
postponed indefinitely. Preston’s motion, which passed by a vote
of twenty-three to nineteen, took the chamber by surprise.
Senator John McCracken Robinson of Illinois, a supporter of
the bill who had been outside the hall during the motion, quickly
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years’ View, 2 vols. (New York, 1854-1856),
II, 72.
Ibid., II, 76.
Ibid., II, 77-82.
Congressional Globe, 25th Congress, 3rd sess., 145.
Ibid., 172.
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moved for reconsideration, and the bill was carried over for
further study. 13
On February 9 when the bill was again being considered,
Senator John Williams of Mississippi called for an amendment
to require all male settlers claiming land to be at least eighteen
years of age. The measure passed, and the bill was printed. 14 On
February 19 the measure came up for final discussion. Despite
opposition from such luminaries as Henry Clay of Kentucky,
Benton’s forces carried the day. The Senate accepted the measure,
twenty-five to eighteen, and sent it on to the House of Representatives. 15
The Armed Occupation bill met opposition in the House
from a variety of sources. One Florida historian has attributed
the bill’s defeat in the House to southern pressure. Large slaveholders and land speculators sought the best land for themselves,
and obstructed efforts to include small farmers in the measure. 16
The St. Augustine News reported that “Southern Conservatives”
in the House had indeed hurt the cause. Worse still, an unusual
alliance of “Southern Whigs, Abolitionists and Federalists” had
conspired to embarrass the Democratic administration of President Martin Van Buren. 17 Should the bill ultimately fail, predicted the News, “the blood of the female and of the infant
shall be on their [the opponents’] heads.“ 18
The House defeat of the bill disturbed Senator Benton but
did not keep him from pressing his case again. With the seating
of the new Twenty-Sixth Congress, he addressed its first session
on December 6, 1839, giving notice of his intentions to reintroduce the Armed Occupation bill. 1 9 On January 3, 1840, Benton’s
Committee on Military Affairs reported a new measure out, and
it became the special order of the day for Monday, January 6. 20
Benton’s persistence with the settlement bill had not gone
unnoticed. On December 27, 1839, the St. Augustine News re13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ibid., 174.
Ibid., 181.
Ibid., 202, 205.
James W. Covington, “The Armed Occupation Act of 1842,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, XL (July 1961), 42.
St. Augustine News, April 27, 1839, quoting the Washington Globe (n.d.).
Ibid., March 23, 1839, quoting the Washington Globe (n.d.).
Congressional Globe, 26th Congress, 1st sess., 20.
Ibid., 96. The Globe did not record the House vote on the Armed Occupation bill, stating only that it failed to pass.
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ceived word of the senator’s renewed efforts, and took the occasion to offer its congratulations: “Mr. Benton has ever exhibited the most commendable zeal and attachment to the interests of Florida. . . . Her cause, with such aid, is in truly able
hands-and we trust that the measure so dear to him . . . will,
with his commanding influences, be soon destined to their full
fruition.“ 21
After the reading of the bill on January 7, Benton took the
floor to deliver a few pertinent remarks. He noted the bill’s
previous Senate passage and read the secretary of war’s report
endorsing armed occupation of Florida. Secretary Joel R. Poinsett
further recommended the raising of 1,000 volunteers to serve as
mounted dragoons. They were to be trained expressly for guerilla
warfare “to render them equal to the Indian in vigor and endurance.” This combination of settlement and defense would
serve both to populate and secure the area in a manner heretofore untried. 22
Benton then indulged in a lengthy polemic on conditions in
Florida, the necessity of the bill, as well as responses to its opposition. Benton referred to several worthy historical precedents
for the armed occupation of hostile territory. The children of
Israel, he contended, had “entered the promised land, with the
implements of husbandry in one hand, and the weapons of war
in another.” The Goths, he reminded his audience, had overtaken
the countries of southern and western Europe in similar fashion.
America herself provided the best examples, beginning with the
“Pilgrim forefathers,” and proceeding to Benton’s own experiences in frontier Kentucky and Tennessee. 23
The army had served its purpose, Benton noted, and deserved the approval of the nation. It had blunted the thrust
of Indian resistance and for two years had encountered no major
enemy concentrations. Some 2,000 Seminoles had been captured
and sent west to reservations in the Indian territory, with the
small remainder scattered throughout the swamps in southern
Florida. The troops had prepared the country for settlement,
Benton reported; they had explored and charted the interior of
Florida, “established some hundreds of posts,” and built “many
21.
22.
23.

St. Augustine News, December 27, 1839.
Congressional Globe, 26th Congress, 1st sess., appendix, 71.
Ibid.
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hundred miles of wagon roads” and “some thousands of feet of
causeways and bridges.” The senator took pride in listing these
achievements and hoped that his colleagues concurred. 24
Benton then directed his attention to the government’s unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Seminoles
in the spring and summer of 1839. These aborted peace efforts,
according to Benton, “only served to show the unparalleled
treachery and savagism” of the “ferocious beasts” with whom the
nation had to treat. The Seminoles accepted the gifts and
blandishments of the peace commissioners only to commit
further murders. The peace overtures, combined with the success of their “treachery,” emboldened the remaining Seminoles
to the extent that they might never be seized as captives. 25
According to Benton, the failed negotiations and offensives
left the Congress a galling choice: accept armed occupation or
acquiesce in failure. Benton then marshalled four arguments to
dramatize the merits of his alternative. First, as a part of the
Union, albeit a territory, the citizens of Florida had a “clear
constitutional right” to demand protection, and not have to
“solicit it as a favor.” Second, “humanity and compassion”
dictated the extension of assistance and protection to Florida.
“These are white people and Christians,” Benton noted, who had
“suffered every extremity and every horror known to Indian warfare.” The senator suspected that this particular point might receive a fair amount of criticism. “According to the pseudophilanthropy of the day,” he said, “white people have but a poor
chance for compassion against negroes and Indians.” But he
hoped to muster enough sympathy for the “white Christian race”
to counter these arguments. 26
The interests of commerce underlined Benton’s third reason
for sponsoring the bill. The Florida peninsula had to be “cleared
of marauders,” replaced by an orderly population, and “subjected
to regular government.” Merchant ships which wrecked off the
long and irregular coast of Florida often encountered parties of
Indians who could not distinguish the crews from the enemy
soldiers, with the result that they killed the sailors and seized
24.
25.
26.

Ibid., 72.
Ibid., 72-73.
Ibid., 73.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol57/iss2/5

6

Welsh: Legislating a Homestead Bill: Thomas Hart Benton and the Second S
L EGISLATING

A

H OMESTEAD B ILL

163

their possessions. In the interior, farmers could neither plant
their crops nor market them for profit. 27
Benton’s fourth contention was an issue of dubious merit.
The peninsula had to be militarily secure, he said, given its
proximity to the West Indies. Benton feared that Great Britain,
having freed her slaves the decade before, might organize black
battalions in the islands to invade Florida, which Benton described as the weakest point of the South. These forces would
march north where “the lever would find its fulcrum to raise the
black population of the South” to revolt. Florida, a “vital link
in the chain of national defense,” required preservation at all
costs. 28
Benton found his bill naturally irresistible. It was the appropriate, efficient, and cheap remedy for Florida’s ills. “The
heart of the Indian,” he believed, “sickens when he hears the
crowing of the cock, the barking of the dog, the sound of the ax,
and the crack of the rifle.” Such a frontier cacaphony was proof
of the white man’s intentions to remain. Indians knew the
transient nature of the soldiers’role; “they are mere sojourners in
the land,” said Benton, “and sooner or later must go away.” By
placing whites in the Indians’midst, the Seminoles would either
assume the offensive or slink off in defeat. 29
Having made his case, the senator relinquished the floor to
his opponents. Senator Benjamin Tappan of Ohio rose to indicate his sympathy for the good intentions of the Armed Occupation bill, but he disapproved of its methods. He doubted
whether yeoman farmers would accept the challenge. “The men
you will probably obtain,” he predicted, “will be the idle and
worthless population of our large cities,” lured by the free rations
and weapons. 30
Senator William Preston then offered his suggestions for ending the Seminole War. He also shared Benton’s concern and went
further to place the blame on “the want of the proper attention
of Congress to the subject.” When the war broke out in 1835,
both the Jackson administration and the general public “regarded this contest as a trifling affair,” requiring a mere demon27.
28.
29.
30.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 74.
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stration of force to induce the Seminoles into submission. Now
Congress had a $25,000,000 expense on its hands and was
“throwing away the country itself.“ 31
It was with the mechanics of the Armed Occupation bill that
Preston took issue. “The conquest of the country,” he declared,
“should be made by an adequate force,” or the war should be
“terminated by treaty.” Congress had no power to impose armed
settlements, he argued, and even if it did, Congress might have
to offer similar inducements at prohibitive expense to other
frontier areas. Furthermore, the terrain of Florida, Preston believed, could support no agricultural endeavor save a plantation
economy with its large number of slaves. Slaveowners could not
defend their possessions as readily as the small freeholder, and
the government, Preston feared, would have to assume the
burden of Florida’s defense. 32
Preston suggested that Congress implement the plan put
forth by General Zachary Taylor during the time he was in
command in Florida (1838-1839). Taylor had called for the
creation of a district defense, dividing the interior of Florida
into sections twenty miles square, each with a command post and
a company of troops. These areas would be policed thoroughly
to drive the Indians from their protection in the brush. Before it
could be implemented, however, the Van Buren administration
aborted the plan in favor of a cease-fire and talks. 33
Preston felt that the government should reinvestigate the
merits of Taylor’s plan. A cordon of military posts might be constructed across the peninsula, with 10,000 men enlisted to sweep
through the territory in a massive dragnet covering every foot of
ground. As for the cost of this expedition, Preston had no qualms;
in light of the multi-million dollar expenses already incurred,
he desired to put an end to the war “at whatever cost.” Benton’s
bill was both inefficient and impotent, and Preston hoped the
second vote would meet a fate identical to its first balloting. 34
After this heated session, on January 8, 1840, the Senate
ordered the Armed Occupation bill up for a third reading. 35 On
January 10, the bill underwent further debate. Senators Robert
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.
Ibid., 75.
Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 249.
Congressional Globe, 26th Congress, 1st sess., appendix, 75.
Ibid., 26th Congress, 1st sess., 107.
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Strange of North Carolina, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky,
Tappan of Ohio, and Preston of South Carolina spoke at length
against it, and offered several amendments. The Senate went
into executive session to discuss the bill and then adjourned without action. 36
On January 12 Benton received an opportunity to respond to
the latest criticisms. In keeping with his style, his answer was
lengthy and involved. Benton began by addressing the curious
appearance of three Spanish land grants claiming ownership of
most of interior Florida. The grants allegedly had been presented
by Ferdinand VII of Spain to three Spanish nobles: the Duke of
Alagon, the Count of Punonrostro, and Don Pedro de Vargas.
The grants, issued from February to April 1818, violated the
eighth article of the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, which ceded the
Floridas to the United States. Article Eight declared all grants
tendered after January 24, 1818, to be null and void, with the
grants in question specifically mentioned by Ferdinand as invalid. 37
Twenty-two years later these “dead, rotten, and putrid
grants, ” as Benton termed them, returned to haunt his efforts at
achieving peace. The original grantees had long since died and
their lands were dispersed among a welter of claimants. The
grants comprised all unclaimed territory in Florida and threatened not only Benton’s proposal but present occupants of Florida
land as well. 38
Despite the curious nature of this challenge, Benton saw it as
“rubbish,” and secondary to more important matters. Senator
Preston’s call for blanketing the peninsula with troops was wellintentioned but uneconomical. To place but one soldier per
square mile would require 45,000 combat troops, with another
major force as replacements and support. Even now, according
to Benton, the existing regiments there were but half-full. Less
than 900 enlisted men served in Florida, yet the costs were still
exorbitant. “Instead of covering the country with soldiers,”
Benton argued, “we wish to cover it with inhabitants.“ 39
Benton then presented letters of support from several key
36.
37.
38.
39.

Ibid., 113.
Ibid., 26th Congress, 1st sess., appendix, 94.
Ibid.
Ibid., 95.
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government officials who had participated directly in the Florida
war. In his annual message to the legislature in January 1839,
Richard Keith Call, Florida’s territorial governor, recognized the
futility of the present offensive warfare. He recommended that
settlers be induced to migrate to Florida. He envisioned 10,000
pioneers helping save millions of dollars and thousands of lives
and preparing the way for Florida’s entry into the Union. 40
Additional support came from Dr. Thomas Lawson, surgeon
general of the United States Army who had witnessed the unpleasant medical aspect of American participation in Florida and
was highly skeptical of success in the present efforts. He projected
another five to ten years of fighting to rid the country of Indians.
The Armed Occupation bill would cast the settlers in a defensive
position, Lawson wrote, as “experience teaches us that we are
better at repelling an invasion than in making a conquest.“ 41
Benton’s third and most prestigious supporter was General
Thomas Sidney Jesup, commanding officer in Florida from late
1836 to late 1838. Jesup had incurred the wrath of many Northerners for his seizure of Osceola in 1837, while the Seminole chief
was ostensibly protected by a flag of truce. Benton felt that
Jesup’s accomplishments far outweighed the criticism. As Benton
noted, Jesup had effected the removal westward of some 2,200
Seminoles; “three or four times more than the number of all the
killed and wounded, taken and removed by all the other Generals
put together.“ 42
Jesup felt that no other measure but the Armed Occupation
bill could break down the last of the Seminoles, unless the government was prepared to imitate the tactics of the British on the
island of Jamaica during the Maroon War of 1665-1739. For
some seventy years black slaves in rebellion eluded capture by
hiding out in the mountains. It was not until the British imported bloodhounds to track down the rebels that the slaves
surrendered, and the war ended. 4 3 Should the government reject
these alternatives, Jesup believed the Indians would be caught
“only by their own consent,” a most unlikely occurrence. 44
40. Ibid., 95-96.
41. Ibid., 96.
42. Ibid.
43. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 265-67.
44. Congressional Globe, 26th Congress, 1st sess., appendix, 96.
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Buttressed by such influential support, Benton discussed at
length the benefits of the bill for prospective settlers. All males
would receive free of charge 320 acres of good farm land, “in a
soft climate, open to sea breezes,” and ripe for production.
Settlers would receive a clothing allowance for one year, payable
semiannually at the rate of $30-50 per person. The settlers would
also receive free rations for one year and arms and ammunition
valued at $30 from the government. They would also receive free
medicine and medical care in military hospitals when necessary. 45
United States troops would transport them to their homesites and
protect them afterwards. 46
Benton, cognizant of Senator Preston’s fears of an inundation
of vagabonds and drifters, was careful to outline the type of
settler likely to accept these generous terms. Benton sought the
yeoman-the “300-acre man,” he called him-the man of “muscle,
nerve, and of labor.” Attracting good men would prove no obstacle since small farmers in land-poor regions of the United
States would provide the core of this migration. 47
The last issue on Benton’s agenda was the dismissal of
abolitionist charges that the Armed Occupation bill guaranteed
another slave state to upset the balance in Congress. Benton welcomed the presence in Florida of small farmers whom he felt
would undoubtedly vote Democratic. Northern Whigs and
abolitionists were sure to object, Benton said, and would muster
all their forces in and out of Congress to defeat the bill. But
their small-mindedness would not permit them to see the larger
benefits of the bill. It would terminate an expensive contest,
pacify a distracted territory, restore exiled citizens to their homes,
and draw an integral part of America closer to the Union. 48
Benton’s powerful rhetoric once again had a great impact
upon his Senate colleagues. His bill met little difficulty in its
last hearings and came up for a final vote on January 20. After
brief remarks by both sides, the totals showed twenty-four ayes
45. Ibid., 97. The rations consisted of 3/4 lb. pork or bacon or 1 1/4 lbs.
fresh or salted beef, 18 oz. of bread or flour or 12 oz. of hard bread or
1 1/4 lbs. corn meal per person per day, plus, for each 100 rations issued,
an additional allotment of 4 lbs. of soap, 1 1/2 lbs. of candles, 2 quarts
of salt, 1 gallon of vinegar, 2 lbs. peas or beans, 10 lbs. of rice, 6 lbs. of
coffee, and 12 lbs. of sugar.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 98.
48. Ibid., 99-100.
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and fifteen nays. Benton had triumphed again. 49 But the victory,
as before, was short-lived. The House of Representatives found
this version of the Armed Occupation bill little different than the
one defeated the previous session, and banished it to a similar
fate.
For the next two years the Seminole War became the least of
Benton’s concerns. Personal problems at home, especially his
wife’s failing health, limited his time on the floor of the Senate.
Increased criticism of his policies in his home state forced Benton
to return to St. Louis on more than one occasion to explain his
actions. But most troubling was the Whig victory in the presidential and congressional elections of 1840. Jacksonian Democrats no longer governed the nation, and the Senate came under
the direction of northern Whigs. New issues confronted Congress
with the Harrison and Tyler presidencies and the consideration
of much Whig legislation. The Armed Occupation bill, twice a
failure in the best of political times, had few prospects in 1841. 50
The bill, dormant for over a year, received a boost on May
10, 1842, when President John Tyler declared an end to hostilities in Florida. He rationalized that there were too few Seminoles (less than 300) left in Florida to justify further operations.
The President suggested that settlers venture into the territory
now that the region was more secure. Six days later Benton once
more introduced his Armed Occupation bill. It was read twice
and dispatched to the Committee on Military Affairs for further
study. On June 2, Benton reported out his bill, asking for early
action. 51
When Benton stepped onto the Senate floor on June 13 to
defend his bill, he detected a changed attitude among his colleagues. The opposition, though still present, seemed less vocal;
some enemies had left office, while others had changed their
minds and were now prepared to support the measure. His arguments remained the same: the need for quick action to ease
Florida’s suffering and the benefits to the nation. Perhaps the
President’s endorsement of the concept of the bill prompted the
change; perhaps the easing of tensions in Florida was responsible.
49. Ibid., 117-30.
50. William Nisbet Chambers, Old Bullion Benton: Senator From the New
West (Boston, 1956), 251-64.
51. Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd sess., 503, 566.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol57/iss2/5

12

Welsh: Legislating a Homestead Bill: Thomas Hart Benton and the Second S
LEGISLATING

A

H O M E S T E A D B ILL

169

Whatever the reasons, the bill’s fortunes seemed at last to
brighten. 52
The crucial stage for Benton’s bill came on July 18, 1842,
when the House of Representatives took up the Armed Occupation bill for the third time. Representative Samuel Stokely of
Ohio spoke first in support of the measure, listing its clauses and
closing with a plea to avoid the disgrace of being beaten in war
by a few savages. Opposition surfaced quickly, as William Cost
Johnson of Maryland opposed the idea of free guns and ammunition. This incentive would lure sportsmen, he argued, who would
range at will throughout Florida in search of game, not farmland. He condemned the system as a “fraud upon the public”
and urged that the bill be set aside. 53
Stokely responded to these charges by telling Johnson that the
clauses granting free weapons and rations had already been
stricken from the bill while in a House committee, replaced by
additional grants of 160 acres of land to the wives of each male
settler. By including women Stokely hoped to enhance permanent
settlement, as “the presence of the families would bind the settlers
to the soil.” To support his case, Stokely narrated several incidents of heroism displayed by women in the early settlement of
the West, a process which Stokely saw as having “a most happy
effect in stimulating the courage and enterprise of their male
relatives.“ 54
Several other representatives offered amendments for and
against the bill, and then John Quincy Adams, former president
and antislavery sympathizer, rose to make several observations. He
disapproved of the use of the word “protection” in the bill, wondering why Florida was more entitled to protection than Massachusetts. Adams sympathized in principle with the bill’s intentions to secure the safety of Floridians. But he also felt that
proper treatment of the Indians, coupled with diplomacy, might
induce the remaining Seminoles to remove west of the Mississippi
and that this bill might not be the answer. 55
Horace Everett of Vermont followed Adams, claiming that
the measure was nothing more than a scheme for land specula52.
53.
54.
55.
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Ibid., 764.
Ibid., 765.
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tion, injurious both to Florida and the rest of the country. He
offered an amendment authorizing the President to pay each
Indian warrior who surrendered and migrated west $1,000, as
well as $200 to every person persuading an Indian to remove. An
additional $100,000 was requested to defray the expenses of this
surrender and migration. Everett’s motion was defeated. 56
With the close of debate in the House on July 18, the Armed
Occupation bill came up for a vote. Its opponents fought to the
end, moving for reconsideration and tabling, and finally adjournment when their other tactics failed. The House, on its
third try, passed the bill by a vote of eighty-two to fifty. Lacking
the original provisions for free weapons and rations, the bill
went back to the Senate for final action. 57
On August 1, 1842, the Senate took up the House version of
Benton’s bill. Senator Joseph White of Indiana objected, stating
that any settlement on the land before conducting an official
survey would result in bothersome litigation. But William
Preston, an old adversary of the bill, registered a telling argument. Times had changed, he said, and Florida no longer needed
troops. Though the House bill limited the inducements to
settlers, some form of relief had to be extended to Florida. The
vote came shortly thereafter, with the Senate passing the bill by
a margin of twenty-four to sixteen. 58
On August 4, 1842, President Tyler signed into law the
Armed Occupation Act. All heads of families, male or female,
as well as single men over the age of eighteen, were eligible for
quarter sections of land. They had to be able to bear arms,
though none were furnished, and to settle in an area bounded
by a line running east and west about three miles north of
Palatka, and ten miles south of Newnansville. No claims could
be made within two miles of an army post, on lands with preexisting private claims, or on land containing “live oak or red
cedar trees.“ 59
A total of 200,000 acres became available to claimants, who
56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid., 765-66.
Ibid., 766.
Ibid., 818.
Armed Occupation Act, August 4, 1842, V U. S. Statutes at Large, 502;
Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 314; Niles' Register,
September 17, 1842; Dorothy Dodd, “Letters From East Florida (1843),”
Florida Historical Quarterly, XV (July 1936), 51-54.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol57/iss2/5

14

Welsh: Legislating a Homestead Bill: Thomas Hart Benton and the Second S
L EGISLATING

A

H OMESTEAD B ILL

171

could apply at land offices in Newnansville and St. Augustine for
60
settlement permits. The permit listed additional requirements:
settlers had to remain on the land for five years, erect a “dwelling
house,” and “clear, enclose and cultivate” at least five acres of
the land. 61 By the close of the year of eligibility, August 4, 1842,
some 1,312 permits had been requested with 1,184 claimed. Most
land was taken near forts, despite restrictions on such activity,
and most permits were issued at the Newnansville land office. 62
Judging the success or failure of Benton’s bill demands more
than mere quantitative analysis. The Armed Occupation Act did
not create Benton’s dream of a “determined band of hard-fighting
farmers.” Few had decent weapons, and fewer still were proficient
in their use. A minor Indian scare in 1849, for example, saw
nearly all interior settlements south of Ocala abandoned. Critics
also felt that these inexperienced farmers bypassed valuable farmland, choosing nonproductive soil instead. 63 On May 3, 1848, the
Florida legislature petitioned Congress to modify the five-year
residence requirement of the Armed Occupation Act, as many
settlers, unfamiliar with Florida’s interior climate and terrain,
encountered “sickness and bad water” on the hammock lands,
and had removed their families to “more healthy spots.” The
legislature felt that those who had attempted to cultivate the
land in good faith deserved title, whether their residency was
five years or not. 64
Despite these arguments, many historians concur in the belief that the Armed Occupation Act was a success. James W.
Covington states that settlers formed a “hard core” of opposition
to the Indians, and by complaining of sporadic Indian conflicts,
forced “reluctant federal officials” into the altercation referred
to as the Third Seminole War (1855-1858). 65 John K. Mahon
takes an approach similar to Covington’s in assessing the act.
Assuming five persons per permit, Mahon figures the addition to
the population of Florida in the years 1842-1843 to have been
nearly 6,500, a sum more than ten per cent of the entire popu60. Covington, “Armed Occupation Act of 1842,” 45.
61. Dodd, “Letters From East Florida,” 52.
62. Covington, “Armed Occupation Act of 1842,” 47; Dodd, “Letters From
East Florida,” 52-53.
63. Covington, “Armed Occupation Act of 1842,” 52.
64. House Miscellaneous Document 78, 30th Congress, 1st sess.
65. Covington, “Armed Occupation Act of 1842,“ 52.
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lace. The act also provided an incentive to settlement not available elsewhere in the United States at that particular time. In
consequence the map of the peninsula was filled out and almost
all portions of the wilderness explored. In 1845, only three years
after the proclamation ending the war, Florida entered the
Union as a state. 66
The Armed Occupation Act stands ultimately as testimony to
Benton’s Jeffersonian faith in the goodness of the American
people, and his Jacksonian adherence to pre-emption, or “first
purchase” of unsettled lands, as the outlet for America’s energies.
The act was the first of several donation acts in United States
history to induce settlement on distant and dangerous parts of
6 7
Benton proposed similar settlement inthe public domain.
centives in 1838 in regards to the Oregon territory, and for settlements along the right-of-way of his “Highway to the Pacific” in
1851. 68 Through Benton’s exertions Florida gained national recognition for the problems unique to her climate and geography,
as well as benefitting from an influx of settlement which otherwise might not have occurred. Benton overcame public indifference both to his measure and the war effort in general, both
partisan and personal opposition among his congressional colleagues, and involvement of his bill in a variety of issues inflaming the public mind, such as expansionism, abolitionism, conservative economic policy, and the like. By war’s end the United
States Treasury had expended nearly $40,000,000 over a period
of eight years to prosecute a war with no permanent treaty signed,
no glory for the participants, no satisfaction for the Indians removed west. Only Thomas Hart Benton’s bill and its Florida
benefactors emerged as a positive development from this tragic
episode in Florida’s and the nation’s history.
66.
67.
68.
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